Ankara, Turkey – Two years ago, relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia stood at one of the lowest points in the history of the two regional powers following the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul.
He was assassinated in October 2018 at the hands of Saudi representatives at the consulate of the kingdom leading to unprecedented Turkish rejection of the Saudi government, clarifying what he said was the duty of those close to the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman , the country’s de facto ruler, in the murder plot.
Today, however, ties between Ankara and Riyadh emerge on their return to cordiality, thanks in part to the detente between Turkey’s Qatar ally and the Saudi-led four-nation bloc that embargo Doha in 2017.
Earlier this month, a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) saw Saudi Arabia and its allies restore ties with Doha, including air space and reopening borders.
The move was hailed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as “very beneficial”.
He said: “We hope to re-establish our position in Gulf co-operation. This will strengthen the cooperation of the Gulf. “
The rapprochement was followed by Qatar’s offer to centralize between Ankara and Riyadh.
“If these two countries see the state of Qatar as part of this mediation, it is possible to do so. It is in everyone’s interest that these countries have friendly relations, ”said Qatari special envoy Mutlaq al-Qahtani.
Prior to the HAI meeting, there were indications of a warming relationship. At the start of the G-20 conference in November, Erdogan and Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz spoke by phone.
The leaders agreed to “maintain open dialogue channels in order to develop bilateral relations and resolve issues”, the Turkish president’s office said.
The foreign ministers of the countries later met at a group of Islamic Cooperation conference in Niger, after which Mevlut Cavusoglu of Turkey promoted their partnership “for the benefit not only of our countries, but for our whole region ”.
Impressive U.S. movement
While the separation has explained many issues in the Middle East and North Africa in recent years, it has been political developments on the other side of the world that have played a major role in shaping ideas. newcomers in Ankara and Riyadh, according to analysts.
“That’s the main reason [former US President Donald] Trump lost the election and Saudi Arabia thinks so [President Joe] Biden will put pressure on Riyadh and then they will have to look for new options, ”said Ali Bakir, assistant research professor at the Ibn Khaldun Center at the University of Qatar.
Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey expect the incoming Biden administration to drastically change its priorities in the region, such as withholding from Trump’s policy of addressing hard on Iran, and a greater emphasis on human rights.
“Unless the Biden administration puts pressure on Riyadh, they will not feel obligated to strengthen relations with Ankara,” Bakir said, adding that Trump’s “agreement” of Saudi actions in 2017 has continued to the Gulf crisis.
Ahmet Evin, a political scientist at Sabanci University’s Istanbul Policy Center, described Trump as a “try” for the Saudi royal family.
“Without the Saudis on board, Trump’s building empire would have gone bankrupt in a while,” he said.
Both countries had “invested heavily politically in the Trump administration, partly because of personal relationships,” said Emre Caliskan, a researcher at the Center for Foreign Policy in London.
“As soon as Trump leaves, they have to change the tone by shifting policies.”
Arab Spring
The decline in Turkish-Saudi relations erupted after the Arab Spring of 2011, where Ankara threw its weight behind groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in the hope of establishing governments that would be sympathetic to Turkey’s Islamic ruling party.
Saudi Arabia and its allies strongly oppose the Muslim Brotherhood and have called the group a “terrorist group”, forcing members to flee their home countries and establishing a base in Istanbul.
Turkey’s support for Mohamed Morsi, who was elected president of Egypt in 2012 but was ousted by the army a year later, was a prime example of Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Riyadh supports the exterminated general who was in charge of a crackdown on his supporters, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
In the 2017 crisis Saudi Arabia and Egypt joined forces with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain to sever diplomatic ties and block Qatar, accusing the country of supporting terrorism and being too close to their rival in Iran.
Doha has always denied these allegations.
They also issued a list of requests that included the closure of a Turkish military base in Qatar and the termination of all ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and coalition groups. bound.
Erdogan criticized the sanctions, while the Turkish parliament agreed to send troops to Qatar. Turkey also arranged for food and other supplies to be sent to its allies.
Subsequently, the Saudis, Emiratis and Egyptians banned Turkish media outlets, as well as Turkish soap operas, and there are unofficial boycotts on Turkish goods.
The split was manifested in places like Syria – where the Arab quarter moved to normalize relations with Bashar al-Assad’s regime while Erdogan retained support for opponents – and the Libyan conflict where the Turkey supports Tripoli-based National Government while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt support the forces of Khalifa Haftar’s re-coalition leader.
‘Tug of war’
However, the “diplomatic war of rebirth” is no longer sustainable, according to Eyup Ersoy, an international relations faculty member at Turkey’s Ahi Evran University.
“The thatching war in regional geopolitics has not given each state clear sovereignty against the other and still carries political and economic costs,” he said.
In terms of the economy, Turkey is driven by the need to attract foreign investors to meet the collapsing economy and “it needs a normal sense of policy. to attract foreign investment, ”said Ersoy.
Aykan Erdemir, senior director at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy in Washington, said an improved trade relationship with Saudi Arabia would alleviate Turkey’s current account deficit.
“Since the 1980s, the Saudi capital has been a breakthrough in a relatively remote Turkish market that was trying to attract foreign direct investment,” he said. “Politics has stopped this relationship.”
Normalization between the Saudi-led coalition and Qatar has lifted barriers to negotiations between Ankara and Riyadh.
Another normalization program, this time between Israel and several Arab states, led by the UAE and Bahrain, threatened to “increase Turkey’s normal isolation in regional geopolitics,” Ersoy said.
“Avoiding such an outcome is another reason for Saudi Arabia’s potential addition to Turkey.”
From Riyadh’s point of view, Turkey’s “diplomatic withdrawal” – Ankara has halted its astronomy against regional rivals and stepped back in areas such as gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean – has expressed Saudi concern about possible “regional hegemony” at Ankara, Ersoy said.
According to observers, however, there are potential obstacles.
Evin argued that Erdogan’s “ideological commitment” to the Muslim Brotherhood could hinder ties but Bakir said the move was no longer a threat to Arab states.
“They were used by the Emiratis and the Saudis as a lawsuit to prove what they did against Qatar,” he said.
At the same time, the similar personal animation between Erdogan and the Saudi crown prince, known as MBS, needed to be fueled in order to foster good relations, according to Caliskan.
“The biggest challenge is the personal relationship between Erdogan and MBS, which has been like a personal vendetta for Erdogan from the Khashoggi case,” he said.
Movements towards improved relations have not addressed fundamental conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and other areas where Riyadh sees Turkey’s footprint as a threat.
In the Gulf, strategic ties between Ankara and Doha, including Turkey’s military base, will continue to “present an incredible challenge to Saudi Arabia,” Ersoy said.
Iran and Turkey
Turkish cooperation with Iran – both supporting each other against U.S. sanctions and working with Russia to resolve the Syrian war – has been another source of warning for the Saudis.
On the other hand, any moves by the Biden administration to pressure Iran could see Saudi Arabia looking to Turkey to help stop Tehran, the country ‘s biggest rival.
Caliskan said the next six months could see the U.S. or Qatar as a mediator between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, with more cooperation driven by financial issues and followed by regional cooperation.
Ankara could also try to divide its ties with Riyadh as it has done with Iran and Israel to separate financial ties from politics, although Erdemir said: “It could be a similar re-division challenge when it comes to Saudi Arabia, especially given the depth of the movement beyond the Muslim Brotherhood. “
Failure to address the main causes of disagreement will only lead to a “temporary” settlement, according to Ersoy.
“In a short time, it would just be sleep.”