The three sectors in which Netanyahu was too successful

22:00 on Tuesday, the date of closing the polls. As usual, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu watched samples at a residence on Balfour Street.

As with any election campaign, he does so in the arms of his small family, and minutes later goes out to his advisers who are waiting for him. Usually, and this time too, Netanyahu does not really need the samples. He knows exactly where the wind is blowing already in the late evening, according to the turnout in the cities identified with him. He remembers almost by heart how many votes he had to get in each ballot box, how many votes there were in his main ballot box in previous election campaigns.

Long before 22:00 he already knew there was a problem. That the Likudniks, who were supposed to go out and strengthen the Likud more than in previous rounds, arrived at a relatively low percentage. What Netanyahu already knew at 20:00 in the evening was confirmed in the middle of the night when the results of the samples were updated again and again.

The Likud lost more than 285,000 votes, not a trivial matter. In the most “strong” polling stations, in places where the Likud has active and powerful mayors, not only was there no strengthening as expected, there was a weakening. Even in Netivot and the Krayot, Likud strongholds have been significant for years.

It probably happened because of indifference, but also because of the technical failures of Election Day – after the main app that the Likud used to know who voted and who else needed to be stimulated, simply collapsed. To this must be added a certain loss in the Likudniks’ belief that it is possible to win, and also the erosion of something in the “Netanyahu” brand.

According to a segmentation conducted in the last day, pollster Rafi Smith, who worked with the Likud, took almost three seats for Netanyahu. These are the seats he often lacks in the Knesset.

After Saar, and perhaps even before, it is worth mentioning Yair Lapid, who led the strangest but also the most brilliant campaign. He wanted to put the area to sleep, and he succeeded. Did not go into battle that would burn everything and did not create a sense of panic in his camp, and consequently not in the opposing camp either. No matter how much Netanyahu tried to push him into the arena, he was not dragged.

When he set out, Lapid marked two main goals: the first – that Netanyahu would not reach 61, the second – that all the bloc’s parties would pass the blocking percentage. He marked V on both.

Back to Netanyahu: In three main centers he worked consistently and thoroughly: in the field of religious Zionist chairman Bezalel Smutrich, in an attempt to help him; in the arena of Naftali Bennett in an attempt to harm him; and in the arena of the Arab parties – to dismantle the joint list.

Netanyahu’s formula was seemingly simple: Smutrich was strong, Bennett was weak and the joint disbanded so that it would not be able to replicate the achievement from the last election. This was supposed to produce the golden number. It seems that this time, in the three centers, Netanyahu was too successful.

Smutrich and the far-right parties, which joined him in a technical bloc, received more seats than expected and became a significant force. So much so that the chairman of the party that sanctifies homophobia, Avi Maoz, entered the Knesset without any need for a “Norwegian law,” and in a way that dictates to Netanyahu what his government will look like.

On the eve of Election Day, when it became clear that Smutrich was safely passing the five seats, the Likud laughed at the fact that at the end of the day, Smutrich was the one to call Netanyahu at the moment of the formation of the government, and not the other way around.

Even in Bennett’s sector, the plan was successful. He remained too small and was unable to complete the 61st for Netanyahu, thanks to an onslaught campaign that dropped her right to a lower-than-single figure.

Netanyahu’s excessive preoccupation with Bennett, the only man who could produce a transition of votes between the blocs, led the right-wing chairman to hysterical moves just before the end, such as the document he signed and asked Netanyahu to sign, and the rest history.

Bennett did record an impressive personal achievement, on the way to forming a cable-free base for the parties on whose backs he entered politics. For Netanyahu, this will not help in any way right now.

As for the joint, it fell apart as Netanyahu wanted – but the bottom line is that the Prime Minister passed the blocking percentage and changed the picture of the seats at the last minute.

Now Netanyahu’s room for maneuver ranges from an extreme right to an extreme left that cannot live together in any way, as Smutrich and Ben Gvir themselves declared when they called RAAM “supporters of terrorism who are not legitimate partners in any government.”

Netanyahu’s excavation deep within the other parties and the hard work, led to a clearly undesirable result. Like a score of 110 in an exam where you only have to get 100.

And now, eyes to Bennett. Will he agree to be prime minister of the other side in a uniquely complex political tangle, and which of his election promises will he stand for: the one who says equal to the right is an insurance certificate that there will be no fifth election, or the one who refuses to sit with Ibtisam Maraana, Meretz and others.