On the night between Monday and Tuesday, IDF forces arrested two Hamas leaders in Nablus, Adnan Asfur and Yasser Mansour, following a wave of arrests that Israel has been carrying out for several weeks among senior members of the organization across the West Bank. Another rumor has it that the arrests will be made on the eve of the Israeli elections, in order to promote the possibility of a prisoner / corpse / missing person deal with Hamas.
The explanation may be simpler and the two are involved to one degree or another in an attempt to establish civilian or military infrastructure in the Nablus area, but at this stage of election preparations, any such arrest immediately raises suspicions – certainly among Hamas supporters – that Israel is trying to narrow the organization’s political power. Such suspicions do Hamas only good and are expected to further increase the turnout among its people.
Regardless of Hamas or Fatah, the May parliamentary and presidential elections in July pose a difficult dilemma for the Israeli government. With each passing day, the likelihood that the elections will take place – a scenario that was imaginary until a few weeks ago – is only rising. So many obstacles have stood. Fatah and Hamas are on the road to an agreement on elections, and quite a few still remain, but for now at least it seems that both sides are succeeding in overcoming the bumps and disagreements and galloping forward towards the elections. First to parliament, then to the presidency and then to the PLO National Council.
Apparently, it is in Israel’s interest for Fatah to represent the Palestinian Authority in the May elections, and for the current 86-year-old president, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), to win the presidential election. But the picture is more complex. A desire for a strong Palestinian Authority, one that can represent all Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
Israel has taken quite a few actions in recent years to perpetuate the Hamas rule in Gaza and weaken the Abu Mazen rule, out of a clear desire to prevent the possibility of a two-state solution at all. According to the logic of the current government, if the split between Hamas and Fatah is maintained, then the idea of two states will continue to be perceived as something between fantasy and illusion.
However, the second option, which also seems reasonable these days – Hamas’ victory in the parliamentary elections – is not expected to serve the Israeli interest. What exactly will Israel do if the next government that rules the West Bank is staffed by senior Hamas figures? How do you deal with such a government? Although Israel already has experience following Hamas ‘victory in the 2006 elections, there is still no doubt that Hamas’ victory in May will create quite a bit of embarrassment in Israel and arouse interest in Hamas among the international community, in Europe and perhaps even among the more liberal circles of the Biden government.
The same people in the Obama administration who supported a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the “Arab Spring” in 2011 are expected to support a dialogue with Hamas if it wins the election.
There is always the possibility that Israel will stop the election, but even that will not play into its hands. During the Trump administration, Israel sent a clear message to the PA that it would not allow elections to take place in the event that Hamas participated in them. But that was in the Trump era. Now the message coming out of Jerusalem is not clear. There is no outright denial of the possibility of holding democratic elections in the territories, but there is also no explicit statement that Israel will indeed allow them. The statement that these mediators hear on the issue is that only after the Israeli elections will the government’s position on the issue become clear.
One issue that is unlikely to be acceptable to Israel is elections in East Jerusalem. In the past, the Palestinians used this excuse as an excuse to cancel the election, but now the approach there says that residents of the east of the city with the right to vote can do so at polling stations in the West Bank or in Palestinian villages in B areas around Jerusalem, such as a-Ram, Azaria, Abu Dis, etc. The presence of Palestinian police forces, so it does not appear that the polling stations are the ones that will bounce the Israelis.
Even on this issue, the last word has not yet been said: the European Union and the United States may still exert considerable pressure on Israel to allow voting in post offices in East Jerusalem, similar to the way the elections were held in 1996 and 2006. Moderate political pressure from the Bush administration in late 2005 The then prime minister, Ariel Sharon (just before he sank into a coma), recently caused the elections to take place in the east of the city.
The lesson learned since then at Fatah (and also in Israel) is that if Fatah wants to win the parliamentary and presidential elections, it must remain united. One list on behalf of Fatah versus one list by Hamas. Otherwise, the results of 2006 could easily be repeated. However, quite a few disagreements, splits, quarrels and conflicts within Fatah can already be marked, which could lead him to a parliamentary election when he is divided, similar To what was in those elections.
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The one who is currently emerging as the key figure in the 2021 elections (at least according to the many polls conducted in the territories) is the most famous Palestinian prisoner, Marwan Barghouti. If he wants, Fatah will run on one unified list; if he does not want to, candidates identified on Fatah’s will face the “official” Fatah list, and possibly other camps in the movement. The one who is expected to benefit from this is, of course, Hamas: Among those identified with the “national camp,” while the Islamist religious camp will rake in all the cash.
At the end of 2005, a few weeks before the parliamentary elections, Barghouti decided that his people would run on a list competing with that of Fatah – “al-Mustaqbal”, “the future”. A lot of pressure was put on him to shelve the idea of a separate list, set up against Fatah corruption. And the appointment of those close to him, and finally he responded and united with Fatah. However, the damage has already been done, and Fatah’s image in the eyes of many in the public was of a divided and divided movement, full of conflicts and corruption. “The problem is that this image has not changed much,” says Dr. Michael Milstein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University. “The Palestinian public already sees the splits and camps within the movement, and nothing seems to have changed.”
The “Barghouti Camp” – as his group of associates is known – is making moves that indicate Barghouti’s intention to run in the presidential election and possibly also on a separate list for parliament. This group, which had previously led Fatah’s Tanzim – Kurdah Fares, Issa Krake, Hatem ‘Abd al-Qader, Ahmad’Anim and others – found itself secluded and expelled from the various institutions of government.
Time and time again, Abbas has kept them away from decision-making centers. Time and time again, they have seen a group of people close to Abbas, corrupt as they may be, gaining power, strength and money, and preserving their status in every way possible, while keeping the Palestinian public away from Hamas and causing it to migrate to Hamas. Negotiations with Abu Mazen and his men, and this time from a position of power.
To this must be added the fact that the PA seems to have done quite a bit to get Barghouti to stay behind bars, and the people of Abu Mazen conveyed messages in this spirit to the Israeli side. Barghouti, for those who forgot, was sentenced to five life sentences for five murders. He will die in an Israeli prison if he is not released in one way or another. “Abu al-Qassam” sees itself as the Palestinian Nelson Mandela, no less.
- 2021 Elections: All the polls, articles and interpretations of leading reporters on the Maariv website
In his view, winning an election, as polls suggest, will pave the way for him out of prison under heavy international pressure on Israel. This scenario may sound imaginary at this point to many Israelis, especially those who refuse to internalize that Washington has changed government. And if these were the results of the election, such pressure would be recorded in a big way.
But the one who is supposed to face Barghouti for the presidency is none other than the current president, Abbas. Although he is already 86 years old, some senior officials from neighboring countries who met him recently say that he is at his peak. Functions, speaks, thinks and acts as yesterday and Tuesday. While the line of senior Palestinians below him (Majed Faraj, Hussein a-Sheikh, Jibril Rajoub and others) suffer from various health problems, Abu Mazen looks as fresh as ever. But he also knows that in the case of a confrontation with Barghouti, the odds are against him.
Perhaps because of this, a representative on his behalf, Hussein a-Sheikh, was sent to Hadarim Prison in Sharon this week. The very decision to send al-Sheikh sounds both delusional and strange. This is none other than Barghouti’s great opponent of Fatah in the stormy summer months of 2000, just before the outbreak of the second intifada. In fact, the rivalry between the two spurred the intifada and the many attacks carried out by Fatah members. The competition between them led their protégés, Tanzim activists and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in each district, to produce as many terrorist attacks as possible, in order to gain more political support and especially funds from then-President Yasser Arafat.
It reached almost delusional proportions when Barghouti decided one winter day in the late 2000s to stop firing on Ramallah’s populated neighborhoods. This is because the residents who live in front of the Psagot settlement complained that the IDF’s response songs caused them heavy damage. Barghouti’s men stopped the fire at the designated time, and at that very moment a-Sheikh’s men started firing at Psagot, mainly to break the ceasefire he had decided. Barghouti.
The climax of the hostility was recorded in a battle between the two over the leadership of the Fatah High Committee in the West Bank (the Tanzim), which ostensibly ended in al-Sheikh’s victory.
In the end, Barghouti became a symbol of that intifada, while a-Sheikh became a symbol of corruption and cooperation with Israel.
Hence, when al-Sheikh was sent to prison to meet Barghouti, many eyebrows were raised in Ramallah. Still, according to Barghouti’s associates, he made it clear to the non-sheikh at the meeting that he had no interest in splitting Fatah or in an internal movement conflict.
At the same time, he also made it clear that he would not agree to the continued appointment of close associates on behalf of, or of family members of, senior members of the Central Committee as candidates for parliament on behalf of Fatah. Abu Mazen’s decision regarding the Fatah list is to establish five different committees, three in the West Bank and two in Gaza Each of them will be headed by three members of the Fatah Central Committee (the highest echelon in the movement), as well as ten or 15 members of the Revolutionary Council. They will be the ones to determine the list of candidates for parliament, and this list will be approved by the Revolutionary Council.
Barghouti, however, fears that this pattern will pave the way for the “sons of” the parliament, while the real leaders who enjoy the support and popularity of the Palestinian public will not win the election. Hence his position was unequivocal: Barghouti’s camp wants primaries. Really primaries, like the ones that were in the Likud at the time, or like the ones that were at work.
Democratic elections among members of the movement. If these do take place, then, according to Barghouti, he will be ready and willing to accept the results, “whatever they may be.” He said if the majority chose Abu Mazen as number one, he would withdraw his candidacy for president. But if an attempt is made to play with the results, as has often happened at recent Fatah general conferences, then Barghouti will not accept them.
A-Sheikh was not satisfied with a visit to Barghouti. He also met with Karim Yunis, the oldest prisoner in the Israeli prison, who murdered soldier Avraham Bromberg in 1981 and has since been imprisoned in Israel. Younes received an honorary appointment from Fatah in 2017, to the movement’s central committee, as a move that was perceived as an attempt to further weaken Barghouti.
The conversation with al-Sheikh was also intended to create buzz around the possibility that if Barghouti runs for president, there will be someone who will try to push Yunis to do the same. So there are those who hope that Barghouti’s many supporters will split between him and Younes and Abu Mazen will win from the no man’s land. This move is mainly intended to threaten Barghouti and has no real possibility. Younes is also not a “hot name” like Barghouti.
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Either way, preparations for the election continue in the meantime. On Tuesday, the Central Election Commission completed its work in registering voters, and in all areas a very impressive response from the public to the committee’s efforts was recorded. Approximately 90% of the potential voters were registered.
There was also a particularly lively movement of Hamas activists, in the West Bank and Gaza, who took to the streets and encouraged potential voters to register in order to achieve the election themselves. Fatah activists also joined the mission, but as in 2006, the green color of Hamas representatives is now much more prominent than Fatah’s yellow.