Twenty years since leaving Lebanon and the discourse on the networks has focused on “no sign” or “no name” war. Experiences of staying in outposts and re-exposure to the combat experiences of the Lebanese generation. Almost like the Yom Kippur War generation.
But this No Similar and also a bit Yes Similar.
The Lebanon War and the sojourn in Lebanon need a shaking of consciousness because of two other matters. Not because of the horrors of war. Every war is a horror. Not because of the missing sign of honor for the fallen. He will never bring them back to life.
This generation needs to shake its understanding and memory: the Lebanon War was a war of choice. False. And the stay in Lebanon was also a false war of choice.
Awakening of consciousness regarding the Lebanon War and the stay in Lebanon is required. Not because of the horrors of war. Every war is a horror. The Lebanon War was a war of choice. False. And the stay in Lebanon was also a false war of choice
As in the Yom Kippur War the political echelon ignored policy options that could have prevented war, as in the Yom Kippur War the warrior echelon carried the price of decisions on its back.
But unlike the Yom Kippur War, the first Lebanon war, born of a lie, came after The Yom Kippur War so that decision makers could learn a lesson. And worst of all, the Lebanon war did not end in a separation of powers or a peace agreement, but only after another 18 years of cruel and painful bleeding.
The lies of the leaderships have not changed since.
The first Lebanon war, or as it was known when it began, “Operation Peace of the Galilee,” began after a year of calm in the Galilee – following an agreement mediated by the American envoy, Philip Habib, between Israel and the PLO.
The reason for the war – the assassination of the Israeli ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, on May 3, 1982 was only a false trigger, That the Israeli government was waiting for him to remove the PLO from Lebanon and make Bashir Jamail, the Christian leader, king of it. In doing so, Israel planned to change the character of Lebanon and become an ally of Israel that would deal with Palestinian terrorism.
The organization that hit Argov was in general a retiring organization from the PLO (Abu Nidal) and did not represent the PLO’s position. In fact, today we know that Arafat himself understood that the cost of continuing the fighting from Lebanon against Israel would lead to the elimination and removal of the territorial base that the Palestinians had in Lebanon. And he was careful that year to initiate terrorist attacks.
As in the Yom Kippur War, the political echelon ignored policy options to prevent it, and the warrior echelon carried the price on its back. But unlike the Yom Kippur War, the First Lebanon War came after it, and lessons could be learned from it.
The Israeli government’s decision to go to war was worded as follows: “The government has decided to entrust the IDF with the task “To exclude all the northern settlements from the firing range of the concentrated terrorists, they, their headquarters and bases in Lebanon.”
In an attempt to reassure the public, Prime Minister Menachem Begin took the Knesset podium and explained that the fighting would stop on the 40 km line.
But the government decision contained two parts in clear Hebrew, which the public did not understand: “to exclude the northern settlements from the range of terrorists’ fire” – a goal that indeed meets the definition of 40 km, as this was the range of weapons known at the time, “The concentrated, they, their headquarters and bases in Lebanon” – this is already a definition that reaches as far as Beirut. There sat the PLO headquarters. Simple for someone who knows intelligence and geography, but is not understood at all by the general public.
Following the government decision, it was stated: “In carrying out this decision, we must not attack the Syrian army unless it attacks our forces,” another complete lie..
Minutes of a Government Meeting 5.6.82, Exit to the Galilee Peace War
Preparations for a Syrian and Palestinian Enemy at the Beginning of the Lebanon War (from “Shalag in Lebanon”, Shimon Golan)
Anyone who looks at the map of the deployment of forces of those days will be able to see “eggs” (markings of location of forces) of the Syrian army, scattered in the area and among them “eggs” of the Palestinian forces. Anyone who wanted to oust the Palestinians had to go through the Syrian forces or confront them.
Defense Minister Sharon explicitly refers, in a situation assessment on June 7, 1982, to the fact that public opinion in the country, the political echelon and the American administration must be prepared for a clash with the Syrian forces in the Lebanon Valley. This is done by creating a snapshot that will convince them that it is inevitable.
“To exclude the northern settlements from the range of terrorists’ fire” – answered the definition of 40 km (the weapon range known at the time), but the continuation of the sentence – “the concentrated, they, their headquarters and bases in Lebanon” – this is already a definition that reaches as far as Beirut
Shimon Golan writes in his book “Shalag in Lebanon” about the decision-making in the High Command during the Galilee War: The second aspect – creating an atmosphere that will reduce the terror, both in the political leadership and in the public, from clashes with the Syrians. Instead, an image must be created that proves that there is no escape from clashing with them, because there really is no escape from it: “The public’s fear of the Syrians must be taken down, because it has become terror,” says Sharon.We have to build a picture, because we know that tomorrow (Tuesday, June 8) we will take care of the Syrians because there is no escape. “
So here are the lies of the first Lebanon war. Not 40 km, but until the conquest of Beirut and the removal of the PLO, even at the cost of war with the Syrians. The commanders of the forces who entered Lebanon knew the plans and immediately moved to Beirut, where they arrived as early as the fourth day of the war.
Later, Menachem Begin stood on the podium at Tel Aviv University and gave a legal and moral justification for a war of choice. He of course raised issues of apprehension of extermination. But the PLO in Lebanon could not destroy Israel. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict spilled over into Lebanon after the PLO was expelled from Jordan and after the Palestinians continued a national struggle for their rights following the occupation of Judea, Samaria and Gaza in the Six Day War. The war in Lebanon is in fact a continuation of the war between Israel and the Palestinians in another territory. The Israeli government did not tell the public this.
The severe attacks that came from Lebanon (in Maalot, Kiryat Shmona, Kfar Yuval, Nahariya, Misgav Am and the coastal road) and the shelling in the summer of ’81 on the Galilee settlements, created a consciousness of ‘war of no choice’. The public believed that terrorism should be stopped. But the motivation of the Palestinian war against Israel has not been discussed.
Later, Begin stood at the podium at Tel Aviv University and gave a legal and moral justification for a war of choice. He of course raised issues of fear of extermination. But the PLO in Lebanon could not destroy Israel.
Following the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon (August 1982), the government allegedly had to return IDF forces home to the international border. But the IDF sank in Lebanon according to a government decision. In the throats of Shiites and Sunnis, Druze and Christians and in fact became a foreign army against which the Lebanese are now fighting. Not the Palestinians.
The Druze Palace in Bahmadon
The war, without a name and without a sign, was not discussed during the years after the establishment of the security strip. The Israeli government saw the stay as a necessity And no one dared to go out. A decision to withdraw is a sign of weakness.
The first Netanyahu government, which included senior commanders of the First Lebanon War – Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, Avigdor Kahalani, and Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon – agreed to leave Lebanon but demanded an agreement and UN 425 and 426 resolutions, which were adopted by the Security Council To Lebanon. No agreement was reached and the IDF remained bleeding for another four years.
The entanglement continued and the price of blood rose. The Amal movement, whose members threw rice at IDF soldiers who liberated them from the Palestinians in June 1982, began attacking IDF soldiers. Hezbollah later rose to Iranian support and became a more brutal and significant enemy. But the IDF remains stuck in the outposts. Digged into its positions – the positions of the government. The changing government ministers remained fixed in their fears and dignity and especially in the decision whether to go out and explain to the public the need to evacuate Lebanon to the Lebanese, or to cling to clichés, and hollow statements like “protecting the northern settlements.”
Reservists at Lake Qarun, Lebanon War, 1984
Every encounter with Hezbollah members has now led to a steep firing of Katyusha rockets on the Galilee. That is, The IDF’s stay in Lebanon had no military value. A balance of terror was created between a country with a strong army and a small guerrilla organization.
Instead of bringing the forces home after the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon, the IDF remained stuck in Lebanon in the throats of Shiites and Sunnis, Druze and Christians, and in fact became a foreign army against which the Lebanese are now fighting. Not the Palestinians
The conscious lie of the period of stay in Lebanon began after three years. Already in ’85 The IDF understood the public debate, the demonstrations in front of Prime Minister Begin’s house and the death toll, and decided to send only regular soldiers to Lebanon. Cannon meat that is silent and obedient. The reserve units stopped serving in Lebanon. The writer of these lines served for three years in Bahmadon, Jabal Brock, Lake Qarun, and then suddenly the order came down not to recruit reservists for Lebanon. The reservists do not know how to remain silent.
The author and his unit are active in Jabal Brock, the Lebanon War
Israeli governments have realized that the farther the war is from the public consciousness, the less criticism it will have. Even the organization of four mothers, which to this day is praised for leading to the exit from Lebanon, actually arose only after the helicopter disaster. To remind you – the disaster happened on February 4, 1997, that is Just 15 years after sunset in the Lebanese mud. Only then did the public consciousness begin to awaken and try to shake the dust off the truth about staying in Lebanon. The sequence of disasters pushed the collective consciousness – the Saluki disaster in which five soldiers were burned (August 97), the flotilla disaster – 11 killed (September 97) and the helicopter disaster with 73 casualties.
In the 1999 elections, this issue had already become a major focus of the elections, and Ehud Barak’s promise to “get the boys out of Lebanon” brought him victory and the prime minister’s job.
In a sober look at the war without a name and without a sign, one must see the war by another name – a war without truth. This is the focus. It’s the truth.
For years, hundreds of soldiers paid with their lives and the integrity of their bodies and souls for false decisions. About a war that had no real purpose behind it and the public debate on it even today, suffers from a misunderstanding of the truth.
Even today, when the government ostensibly fights the corona plague, blossoming horror scenarios to justify its decisions (for political or survival reasons), it adopts the same methods used by governments that left IDF soldiers to bleed in Lebanon. In order to solve the Palestinian problem, without paying a political price and without establishing a Palestinian state, there is no choice – we must stay in Lebanon to prevent terrorist infiltration into the Galilee, even though we have already expelled the terrorists and we are fighting Lebanese organizations. Galilee localities.
For years, hundreds of soldiers paid with their lives and the integrity of their bodies and souls for false decisions. About a war that had no real purpose behind it and the public debate on it even today, suffers from a misunderstanding of the truth
Returning to the experiences of the warriors only diverts the discussion from the responsibility of the decision makers to tell the truth about reality. Lead only to wars in which the warriors and the public understand the real need for risk to life and the purpose and price required for it. In wars as in civilian life itself mistrust between the leadership and the public is the most difficult problem.