Eventually, Stadia Games and Entertainment teams got the software and people it needed to get Stadia games prototyping games. A Google-sized pay-per-view and exit ramp from the hamster wheel with crunch fuel was enough to draw a critical mass of developers to Stadia Games and Entertainment. Artists, producers, audio experts, programmers were pushed by the promise of making one-of-a-kind games for revolutionary software – and, many believed, without the threat of layoffs hangs like the sword of Damocles, as is also often the case at traditional game companies. Teams explored what Google games would look like, how best to tap into the power of Google’s big data centers and showcase cloud games. Covid-19 then hit.
In April 2020 – a month after the Los Angeles studio was announced – Google implemented a recruitment freeze. “Now is the time to significantly reduce the pace of recruitment,” Pichai said in an internal message, “while maintaining momentum in a small number of strategic areas where consumers and businesses rely on Google for ongoing support, and where our growth is critical. so successful. “Gaming, according to four sources, was not one of those” strategic areas. “
“If the company was okay putting us on a recruitment freeze, they were also okay with damaging our ability to build content,” says one source. “The studio was not yet fully formed and ready to play games. That put the brakes on, and it was a statement. We described it as a lack of commitment from Google to make content. ”
Not Google the first tech giant to run into those problems. Amazon followed a similar arc. In 2020, PRAY a study of the great challenges Jeff Bezos ’empire has faced in bringing out first-party games in the Amazon Game Studios. Like Google, Amazon hired the best: trusted by developers Far Cry 2Clint Hocking, Frost System 2by Ian Vogel, EverQuestJohn Smedley, and PortalKim Swift, many of whom are excited about sustainability and the relatively higher paychecks associated with the tech giant. Amazon’s goal, according to several sources, was to create a billion-dollar franchise that would help advertise the company’s cloud technology, proprietary game engine, and Twitch streaming service.
The approach, sources say, was progressive. Amazon wanted to “win at games,” developing several AAA games at the same time despite not having a strong history in the industry. Amazon Game Studios boss Mike Frazzini has no prior professional experience in games. High expectations combined with Amazon’s idioms – an obsession with in-house software, for example, and a fix on measuring success with data – have led to post-failure failure. Amazon has canceled at least three of its games: Project Nova, Breakaway, and Concrete, the last of which was postponed just five months after his release.
AAA game development can cost between $ 100 million and $ 200 million. Successes like Blizzard’s Overwatch coming from the ashes of the failures, like the largely obliterated online multiplayer gameplay Titan. Product design by large tech companies may not always be straightforward, but game design is a labyrinth intensive on resources and money.
“I think it’s a lack of understanding of the process,” said one source working at Stadia. “People at action seemed to not fully understand how to navigate a very creative, cross-disciplinary place. ”
Throughout Google’s recruitment freeze, game developers felt they were achieving their goals. Prototypes were being developed without full resources; the studios were not operating at full capacity. When it came time for performance reviews, three sources say, Google was judging game developers against criteria created for UX or visual designers. There is no number associated with “fun-to-play,” or process-based workflows for generating creativity. Former game developers lobbied for their work culture as much as they could. Over time, Google seemed to soften. Developers got the tools they needed, the appropriate review processes. But not the headline. There was still fear.