Hezbollah’s reasons for trying to shoot down an Israeli UAV

The Russians, for their part, claim that they are not authorizing Syria to supply Hezbollah with anti-aircraft guns, and this was also one of the reasons why Hezbollah almost completely avoided using the batteries of anti-aircraft missiles smuggled into it from Iran with Iranian funding.

Hezbollah and Lebanon, it will be recalled, constantly claim that Israel violates Lebanon’s sovereignty by infiltrating Israeli warplanes, helicopters and UAVs. Israeli aircraft in Lebanese skies for intelligence purposes, and are sometimes used to attack targets in Syria.

Despite these allegations, as stated, Hezbollah refrained from using the anti-aircraft missile batteries it has against Israeli planes, for fear that Israel would harm them, and that the very use of them would incriminate the Russians. , Was in October 2019.

Apparently in an attempt to avenge the glider attack attributed to Israel, Hezbollah fired an anti-aircraft missile at the Israeli UAV and missed. The same shooting was preceded by a statement by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who said after the glider attack in Beirut that Hezbollah would not allow Israel to violate Lebanon’s airspace. As mentioned, the shooting was unsuccessful, but it was possible to understand Hezbollah’s motives for this rare use of the anti – aircraft missiles it received from Syria. This is probably also the reason why Israel did not respond to the Lebanese anti – aircraft firing at the end of 2019.

Apparently, there is no particular reason why Hezbollah would want to use the anti-aircraft batteries he received and which he hides and saves for a large-scale confrontation, and even for a war with Israel. However, there are still several reasons for this shooting, which failed.

The first possible reason is that Hezbollah wants to increase tensions in Lebanon, in order to evade the criticism leveled at it among Lebanese citizens. The country blames the organization for both the political crisis, the economic crisis and the health crisis, which together are smashing the land of cedars.

A confrontation with Israel, especially if the latter initiates it as a result of anti-aircraft fire, will allow Hezbollah to prove that it is “defending Lebanon,” and to silence criticism of it.

This threat is intended to expand the equation of deterrence that already exists between Israel and Hezbollah. After the active killing at Damascus International Airport, Hezbollah twice tried to hit Israeli soldiers on Mount Dov and the Menara area and failed. The IDF has continued to be on alert since then, and Hezbollah has not succeeded. It is very possible that Hezbollah tried to save Nasrallah’s honor by downing a relatively large Israeli UAV, thus closing the event.

Another possibility is that Hezbollah has made improvements to its outdated anti-aircraft system, and is trying to test whether these improvements allow it to hit Israeli drones, after failing to do so in October 2019. In fact, it could be a kind of weapons test.

Another possibility from a political point of view is that the Iranians now have an interest in increasing tensions in the Middle East through its envoys, in order to put pressure on the Biden administration to remove the harsh sanctions imposed by former President Donald Trump on Tehran.

Beyond that, of course there is a possibility that this was a mistake or error of an operator. But this is a particularly unreasonable possibility, when it comes to a weapons system that Hezbollah is trying to hide so that it will be at its disposal, as stated, during a major conflict with Israel. The great advantage of the batteries and air vehicles that Hezbollah received from its Iranian patrons through Syria is that they are portable, and capable of quickly launching and changing places. Thus, they will be able to avoid being hit by the Israeli Air Force.

At the moment, it is difficult to assess how Israel will react to the firing of the anti-aircraft missile that did not succeed in its goal. Hezbollah may well try again to restrict the Air Force’s freedom of air action in Lebanese skies.

On the other hand, it is also clear that Israeli action in Lebanon will provoke a Hezbollah response, and could also lead to rocket fire into Israeli territory. The result could be reflected in escalation, and probably in at least a few days of fighting, which would cause damage to both sides.

Therefore, against the background of the distress and lack of governance in all areas of Lebanon, and in the shadow of the Israeli elections, there are now feverish discussions in the Kirya about how to respond, if at all, and if so – when. Both sides have no interest in the war now, but Hezbollah wants to deliberately create tensions.