The motive behind Chief of Staff Kochavi’s “Iranian speech.”

On the other hand, for Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other US allies, it is important that the exact opposite happens: that the US squeeze as many concessions as possible from Iran, even before it begins to remove the oil embargo and restrictions on its global financial arena.

In Washington, however, policymakers need time – first to formulate an outline for conducting diplomatic dialogue with Iran, then for the negotiations themselves and finally for implementation. This is a very difficult task when it comes to the US and Iran, whose trust is close to zero. That is why the new US Secretary of State, Tony Blinken, is trying to lower expectations and persuade the parties to be patient. He does not want the Iranians to be tempted to provoke the United States to use nuclear weapons if they do not hurry to remove the sanctions. Defend themselves.

It is likely that at the end of preliminary negotiations between the US and Iran, a process will be seen in stages, at the beginning of which the governments in Washington and Tehran will make a series of small moves and builders of training towards each other. If the goal is achieved and trust is built, they will move on to the next stage – where at the request of the US – and possibly with the participation of the other signatories to the nuclear agreement – the parties will also discuss amendments and adjustments to the original agreement.

After this stage, it is likely that the Biden people intend to completely remove the sanctions that Trump imposed when he withdrew from the nuclear deal. However, there will still be a critical mass of sanctions or a threat of sanctions that will encourage Iranians to discuss issues with the Americans that the original nuclear deal did not cover. At the forefront of these issues are the “weapons program” (development, production and testing of the nuclear warhead itself); Restriction on the development and production of long-range missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead; An Iranian commitment to end its undermining of the stability of the countries of the region and the violent takeover through its emissaries of countries and regions in the Middle East. At this point, Washington’s goal will be to reach new agreements.

Even before these processes begin, the Biden administration will have to talk to the other countries that have signed the nuclear agreement and coordinate their moves with them. It will also be necessary to agree in advance on the arrangements for supervising the implementation of the agreements and dispute settlement arrangements that will arise during the process. This story, in its American version, is supposed to be long and slow – but the Iranians, stressed and impatient, may try to shorten it through defiant moves. They may also secretly, under the auspices of the process, accelerate their nuclear program to the point where Iran becomes a “nuclear threshold” country. Such a state is capable within weeks of producing the first nuclear warhead, which will oblige the countries of the region, especially Israel, to treat it as a nuclear threat.

I can not say for sure that the Chief of Staff did not have another agenda, related to the struggles he is waging over the IDF budget with the Ministry of Finance, or his relations with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which are not at their best lately. However, what Kochavi has said in the Iranian context undoubtedly echoes the prime minister’s position, and may also support the military’s demand for a special budget increase to fund preparations for an attack on Iran.

If so, anyone looking for an interest that motivated Kochavi to say the things will not have a hard time finding it. However, after checking with some of the people involved, and from my acquaintance with Kochavi, I conclude that the chief of staff spoke out of deep concern and out of position – and not because they told him what to say or how to say. After the speech, Kochavi told people around him that And point to existential dangers and threats when he notices them, even if he is criticized for intruding on the territory reserved for political captains and could damage relations with the new administration in Washington.

As for relations with the new US administration, I know for a fact that Chief of Staff has already said similar and more detailed things to US Chief of Staff Mark Millie, who visited here a few weeks ago. Therefore, in Washington they knew exactly what Kochavi thinks – and now the whole world knows too. It can be estimated that the explicit things Kochavi said were actually meant to strengthen the American hand in the poker game that the Biden administration is currently waging with the Iranians. The fact that Washington did not respond at all to the Israeli chief of staff’s remarks, while Khamenei’s adviser was quick to contradict them and claim that Israel has no ability to threaten Iran, reinforces this assessment.

What worries the Chief of Staff and the entire Israeli security establishment are three main flaws in the original nuclear agreement (“JCPOA – Comprehensive Joint Action Plan”). These flaws are headed by the section called “Sunset”, or in short “Sunset”, “According to which Iran can conduct a full nuclear program without restriction in 2030, when the original agreement signed in July 2015 expired. This clause allows Iran to make all necessary preparations for the production of nuclear bombs with the approval of the international community. A nuclear threshold, “which could erupt at the bomb within weeks without anyone being able to stop it during a diplomatic or military course.

Another critical flaw is that the agreement between Iran and the superpowers does not prohibit Iran from developing its own nuclear weapons. Iran has not acknowledged the existence of the so-called “weapons group”, which was directly overseen by the assassinated Muhsin Fahrizadeh, so the agreement ignores this critical element in the military nuclear program – and does not prohibit Iran from carrying it out as it does not regulate its existence.

The third critical problem in the agreement are the high-speed centrifuges from modern models that Iran has developed and is now starting to install in underground facilities in Natanz and Purdue. These centrifuges, models IR-6 and IR-8, are capable of enriching uranium at a rate five to ten times greater than the old centrifuges – hence they make it possible to produce fissile material for several warheads within a few months. This is what Kochavi is referring to when he talks about the possibility that Iran will “storm” towards the nucleus.

Kochavi fears that even if negotiations between the Biden and Tehran governments take place, the Iranians will not agree to correct these flaws – just as they will not agree to give up long-range missiles. However, Iran’s subversion through emissaries does not pose an existential danger to Israel. At the core of the Chief of Staff’s concerns.

The wall-to-wall backing that Kochavi received for his unusual appearance in style and essence indicates that he gave expression to the matter that is at the heart of the Israeli security consensus. Therefore this show was received with understanding and without response from Washington. However, it is worth remembering that Israel’s adaptation process to the Biden administration requires its captains to maintain a low profile, to manage the real disputes and resolve them only in chambers. This is what senior government officials are interested in, and rightly so. No good will come to us from a confrontation with our sponsoring power.